I WORK FOR YOU

   

CIVIL CODE

    1549.  A contract is an agreement to do or not to do a certain thing.

CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE
DIVISION 5.  PERSONNEL
PART 2.  STATE CIVIL SERVICE

    19572.  Each of the following constitutes cause for discipline of an employee, or of a person whose name appears on any employment list:
   
           (a) Fraud in securing appointment.
           (b) Incompetency.
           (c) Inefficiency.                       
           (d) Inexcusable neglect of duty.
           (e) Insubordination.
           (f) Dishonesty.
           (g) Drunkenness on duty.
           (h) Intemperance.
           (i) Addiction to the use of controlled substances.
           (j) Inexcusable absence without leave.
           (k) Conviction of a felony or conviction of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. A plea or verdict of guilty, or a conviction following a plea of nolo contendere, to a charge of a felony or any offense involving moral turpitude is deemed to be a conviction within the meaning of this section.
           (l) Immorality.
           (m) Discourteous treatment of the public or other employees.
           (n) Improper political activity.
           (o) Willful disobedience.
           (p) Misuse of state property.
           (q) Violation of this part or of a board rule.
           (r) Violation of the prohibitions set forth in accordance with Section 19990.
           (s) Refusal to take and subscribe any oath or affirmation that is required by law in connection with the employment.
           (t) Other failure of good behavior either during or outside of duty hours, which is of such a nature that it causes discredit to the appointing authority or the person's employment.
           (u) Any negligence, recklessness, or intentional act that results in the death of a patient of a state hospital serving the mentally disabled or the developmentally disabled.
           (v) The use during duty hours, for training or target practice, of any material that is not authorized for that use by the appointing power.
           (w) Unlawful discrimination, including harassment, on any basis listed in subdivision (a) of Section 12940, as those bases are defined in Sections 12926 and 12926.1, except as otherwise provided in Section 12940, against the public or other employees while acting in the capacity of a state employee.
           (x) Unlawful retaliation against any other state officer or employee or member of the public who in good faith reports, discloses, divulges, or otherwise brings to the attention of, the Attorney General or any other appropriate authority, any facts or information relative to actual or suspected violation of any law of this state or the United States occurring on the job or directly related to the job.

FOR UNAUTHORIZED POLCE CONDUCT

IF THE "STOP" ISN'T AUTHOIRZED THEN HOW CAN IT BE REASONABLE?

MAGNA CARTA
1215

Please don't pull us over officer.   We're just on vacation.

The rationale upon which the "reasonable suspicion " doctrine is based, a doctrine that thwarts the notion of liberty and freedom from state intrusion in a mobile society, must be founded on an objective basis for suspecting that a particular person is engaged in criminal activity, lest we "sweep many ordinary citizens into a generality of suspicious appearance merely on hunch." Rodriguez, 976 F.2d at 596.   Reasonable suspicion can not rest upon the hunch of an experienced officer, even if the hunch turns out right.
USA v JIMINEZ MEDINA (1999) No. 97-10055 U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals

...infractions are not crimes...

...the Legislature did not intend to classify infractions as crimes.
       
FN 1.  Battle soundly reasoned infractions are not crimes;...
People v. Sava (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 935

We conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, probable cause to believe that there had been a traffic infraction or non-criminal violation was insufficient to justify an impoundment of a vehicle parked in the owner’s driveway, in the absence of a valid caretaking purpose.
MIRANDA v. CITY OF CORNELIUS (2005)  No. 04-35940, 9th Cir. Court of Appeals
   
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.   In this case we decide whether the temporary detention of a motorist who the police have probable cause to believe has committed a civil traffic violation is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures unless a reasonable officer would have been motivated to stop the car by a desire to enforce the traffic laws.
WHREN et al. v. UNITED STATES (1996), 517 U.S. 806

The answer is sitting in that car.











BREAK THE LAW  =  FAILURE TO COMPLY  =  FAILURE TO PERFORM SPECIFICALLY  =  SIN



Grocery shopping?!   Yeah right!   Gimme your license punk!



Who's Got MOTIVE & OPPORTUNITY To Cheat?









$45 MILLION BUCKS ANNUALLY TO YELL AT PEOPLE



California Code of Judicial Ethics

CANON 3

A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES
OF
JUDICIAL OFFICE IMPARTIALLY AND DILIGENTLY








They really can be quite likeable once you get to know them.

Did Officer Underling acquire that property for his boss legally?   Did he have or was he responding to a warrant?


- RULE OF AGENCY -




Capt. Dearest

STOP MAKING ME AN ACCESSORY TO GRAND THEFT AUTO AFTER THE FACT YOU WORTHLESS WONK!

...as appellant correctly points out, ratification occurs only by a principal, not by an agent. (See Civ. Code, § 2310; see also Alvarado Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 476, 481 [219 Cal.Rptr. 52], affirming "the well-settled rule of agency that a principal will be held to have ratified the agent's actions where he voluntarily accepts the benefits of the unauthorized transaction.")
Murphy v. Padilla (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 707

                   

    So let's get down to brass tacks.   The following are unassailable facts:  

              

CALIFORNIA VEHICLE CODE

12801.5.  (e) Notwithstanding Section 40300 or any other provision of law, a peace officer may not detain or arrest a person solely on the belief that the person is an unlicensed driver, unless the officer has reasonable cause to believe the person driving is under the age of 16 years.
   
14607.6.   (b) A peace officer shall not stop a vehicle for the sole reason of determining whether the driver is properly licensed.

"Common as the event may be, it is a serious thing to arrest a citizen, and it is a more serious thing to search his person; and he who accomplishes it, must do so in conformity to the law of the land.   There are two reasons for this; one to avoid bloodshed, and the other to preserve the liberty of the citizen.   Obedience to the law is the bond of society, and the officers set to enforce the law are not exempt from its mandates.".
Town of Blacksburg v. Bean (1916) 104 S.C. 146, 88 S.E. 441
Allen v. State (1924) 197 N.W. 808, 810-11 (Wis.)

[2, 3] "... Substantial circumstances [are required] to justify the detention and questioning of persons ..." (People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 683 [72 Cal.Rptr. 800, 446 P.2d 800]). "[T]he police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which ... reasonably warrant that intrusion." (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906, 88 S.Ct. 1868].) "'There must be a "rational" suspicion by the peace officer that some activity out of the ordinary is or has taken place ... some indication to connect the person under suspicion with the unusual activity ... [and] some suggestion that the activity is related to crime.' [Citation.] Where the events are as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity, a detention based on those events is unlawful." (Irwin v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.3d 423, 427.)
Barber v. Superior Court (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 326
[Civ. No. 12528. Court of Appeals of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. January 30, 1973.

[1] Thus, a detention based on "mere hunch" is unlawful (People v. Nailor, 240 Cal.App.2d 489, 493 [49 Cal.Rptr. 616]), even though the officer may have acted in good faith (Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1, 22 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906]). There must be a "rational" suspicion by the peace officer that some activity out of the ordinary is or has taken place ... some indication to connect the person under suspicion with the unusual activity... [and] some suggestion that the activity is related to crime." (People v. Henze, 253 Cal.App.2d 986, 988 [61 Cal.Rptr. 545].) [2] Where the events are as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity, a detention based on those events is unlawful. (People v. Moore, supra, 69 Cal.2d 674, 683; People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe, supra, 62 Cal.2d 92, 96; People v. Escollias, 264 Cal.App.2d 16, 19-20 [70 Cal.Rptr. 65]; People v. Hunt, 250 Cal.App.2d 311, 314 [58 Cal.Rptr. 385].)
Irwin v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.3d 423
[L. A. No. 29665. In Bank. Dec. 17, 1969.]

The vice of this sort of legislation is quite aptly pointed out in the case of United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 [23 L. Ed. 563, see, also, Rose's U. S. Notes], in which the court says: "If the legislature undertakes to define a new offense and provide for its punishment, it should express its will in language that need not deceive the common mind:  Every man should be able to know with certainty when he is committing a crime. . . . It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders and leave it to the courts to step inside and see who could be rightfully detained and who should be set at large."
In re Peppers (1922) 189 Cal. 682

Every man should be able to know with certainty when he is committing a crime. (In re Peppers, 189 Cal. 682, 686 [209 P.896].)
Agnew v. City of Culver City (1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 144

Even if the officer is not expected to know the law of all 50 states, surely he is expected to know the California Vehicle Code...
CLEMENT  v.  J & E SERVICE INC. (2008) No. 05-56692, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Even if the officer is not expected to know the law of all 50 states, surely he is expected to know the California Vehicle Code,...
THE PEOPLE v. JESUS SANTOS SANCHEZ REYES (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 856

     "...infractions are not crimes...  ...the Legislature did not intend to classify infractions as crimes."    
       
FN 1.  Battle soundly reasoned infractions are not crimes;...
People v. Sava (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 935

WARRANTLESS ARREST

To legally arrest and detain, the Government must assert probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime.
Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 239

When the seizure of a person amounts to an arrest, it must be supported by an arrest warrant or by probable cause. (Kaupp v. Texas, supra,  538 U.S. at p. 630.)  Probable cause exists when the facts known to the arresting officer would persuade someone of "reasonable caution" that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. (Dunaway v. New York (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 208, fn. 9.)
People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667

By its definition, probable cause can only exist in relation to criminal conduct.  
   
The Ninth Circuit, as well as the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, have recognized that probable cause can only exist in relation to criminal conduct. 
Allen v. City of Portland (1995) 73 F.3d 232 (9th Cir.)

[6b] The judiciary has a solemn obligation to insure that the constitutional right of an accused to a fair trial is realized. If that right would be thwarted by enforcement of a statute, the statute, as in Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. 284, and Washington v. Texas, supra, 388 U.S. 14, must yield.
Hammarley v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 38

...Hanson violated Stevens' right not to be arrested in the absence of probable cause to believe Stevens had committed a crime, and that right was clearly established and would be known to a reasonable officer in the circumstances.
Stevens v. Rose (2002) 298 F.3d 880, 9th Cir.

An answer, a demurrer, and a motion to strike constitute a general appearance (Code Civ. Proc., § 1014), since a court does not decide questions raised by such pleadings at the behest of persons over whom it has no jurisdiction.   A court need not have jurisdiction over the person, however, to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.   Indeed, the court must dismiss on that ground on its own motion. (Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315, 326-327 [9 S.Ct. 289, 32 L.Ed. 690]; Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 302-303 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715].)   Thus, a challenge to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court is not inconsistent with a challenge to personal jurisdiction.   Moreover, since the court must dismiss on its own motion, an appropriate challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction aids the court in performing its duty.   The defendant should therefore be allowed to point out lack of subject-matter jurisdiction without making a general appearance.
Goodwine v. Superior Court (1965) 63 Cal.2d 481

...the state must not profit from its own wrong. (Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64-65 [74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503, 506-507]; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 [69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153, 158-159]; People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755, 760 [290 P.2d 855].)
People v. Parham (1963) 60 Cal.2d 378
   
It has long been the law of California "that evidence obtained by such unconstitutional means [illegal arrests, searches, and seizures] is inadmissible at the trial [citations] and incompetent to support an accusatory pleading [citation]." (People v. Valenti (1957) 49 Cal.2d 199, 203.)
People v. Sherwin (2000) No. C030485. Cal.App.4th

There is a constitutional right to be free from criminal prosecution based upon evidence that was illegally obtained by the government.
Devereaux v. Abbey (2001) 263 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir., en banc)

The principle that animates these cases is simple: a search is unreasonable — and so violates the Fourth Amendment — if its justification is grounded in officers “engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment.” Kentucky v. King, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1858 (2011).
UNITED STATES of America v. Dawud Ali SAAFIR (June 11, 2014) No. 13–4049, United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.    
  
(c) The proper test follows from the principle that permits warrantless searches: warrantless searches are allowed when the circumstances make it reasonable, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to dispense with the warrant requirement.   Thus, a warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances is reasonable when the police did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct violating the Fourth Amendment.
          
Because the officers in this case did not violate or threaten to violate the Fourth Amendment prior to the exigency, we hold that the exigency justified the warrantless search of the apartment.        
KENTUCKY v. KING (2011) No. 09-1272, U.S. Supreme Court

- JURISDICTION -



QUALIFIED IMMUNITY INTACT

BWUHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!

WHAT RIGHTS ARE AFFECTED BY THE ARREST?

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

Vol. 25,  June 1973

Nonarrest Automobile Stops:  Unconstitutional Seizures of the Person

B. Individual Interests

        The state interests in investigative and inspection stops must be balanced against the individual interests at stake in an automobile stop. Analysis of fourth amendment case law suggests that automobile stops may impinge on at least five of an individual's seizure-related fourth amendment interests.

I. Freedom from arbitrary state interference.

        A motorist has a fourth amendment interest in being free from arbitrary state interferences," as do nonmotorists.   Ordinarily this protection is afforded by requiring that an "objective evidentiary justification""' single out an individual for seizure."   However, in some circumstances protection from arbitrary interference may be afforded if an officer who can demonstrate that his action is legally authorized seizes members of a class on a regularized basis."'   A motorist's interest in freedom from arbitrary state interferences will be violated when he is seized in circumstances which provide neither of these guarantees against abuse of policemen's seizure powers.

2. "Autonomous self-positioning."

        An automobile stop impinges upon an individual's interest in making autonomous decisions to remain where he is or to go elsewhere."   Terry held that whenever an individual has been deprived of this autonomy he has been seized."   Obviously, this interest is as strong for a stationary individual as for the occupant of a moving car.

3. Free Passage.

        A moving individual has a further interest in liberty of movement which a stationary individual does not have-the interest in being able to continue his movement.   The Supreme Court recognized this interest in "free passage without interruption" in Carroll v. United States."   Carroll arose in the context of the stopping of an automobile to allow a search,"' but it has also been cited by the Court in discussing stops to allow seizures."'
   
        Clearly any moving individual has an interest in free passage, but a motorist's interest is especially strong.   First, an individual utilizes a car specifically to enhance his personal mobility.   In addition, while anyone can interrupt the movement of a slowly moving individual-for example, a pedestrian - ordinarily only a policeman can stop a motorist."'   Thus, as a practical matter, the occupant of a moving car has greater expectations of achieving free passage. These expectations have constitutional significance because fourth amendment jurisprudence holds that reasonable expectations of freedom from government interference play a role in the delineation of fourth amendment rights.

4. "Autonomous other-encountering."

        Automobile stops also impinge upon an individual's interest in avoiding those whom he does not wish to encounter."   Although closely related to and often realized by exercise of autonomous self-positioning, this interest has distinct content.   The distinction is obscured by the fact that a policeman can ordinarily encounter a motorist only by interfering with his autonomous self-positioning and freedom of passage.   The distinct content of this interest may be seen, however, in the fact that a policeman can encounter a stationary individual without interfering with his autonomous self-positioning."   The interest in autonomous other-encountering exists for both stationary and moving individuals, but it is especially strong for a motorist because he can almost entirely avoid undesired encounters with individuals other than policemen.

5. Privacy rights.

        Finally, the occupant of a moving automobile has special fourth amendment privacy interests which stem from the operation of fourth amendment search law.   Case law holds that plain sight observations by policemen are not searches,"' and that a policeman who is justifiably in a position to observe incriminating evidence in plain sight" may arrest on that basis."   Thus a policeman who lawfully" approaches a vehicle may arrest its occupant if he observes illegal activity or illegal objects in plain sight."   On the other hand, search law governs a policeman in searching for objects not visible from outside the car.
   
        The interaction of these doctrines gives a motorist greater privacy expectations than either a pedestrian or an occupant of a stationary car has.   First, a pedestrian has neither the degree of personal privacy afforded by an automobile's design"' or a vehicle occupant's opportunity to conceal objects.   The motion of a moving car further gives a motorist greater privacy than the occupant of a stationary car has.   An automobile is only partially enclosed and therefore only partially private; anyone may easily approach and look into a stationary vehicle.   A moving car, on the other hand, though not a shield from all intrusions, is difficult to approach, and it is therefore difficult to observe its contents.   The combined factors of a vehicle's enclosed nature and its movement thus afford the occupant of a moving car greater expectations of privacy than either a pedestrian or an occupant of a stationary vehicle has.

13 CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE 3d

Constitution
Right of Privacy
Property Rights
Right to Travel
Liberty

§237.  Right of Privacy

        The state constitution provides that all persons have the right to pursue and obtain privacy(14).
   
        The California constitutional guarantees is motivated by concern over contemporary society’s accelerating encroachment on personal freedom and security caused by increased surveillance and data collection(18).  It exists to prevent governmental snooping, to inhibit the overly broad collection and retention of unnecessary personal information(17)...
        Ibid. p. 527       
                               
        ...the right of privacy had been recognized as a fundamental right in this state.
   
        ...right of privacy guaranteed by the state constitution is much broader than the privacy guaranteed by the federal Constitution(23).
   
        ...it is the right of a person to lead his or her private life without intrusion the government.

§238.  Right to Travel

        The nature of the federal union and of constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of the United States uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations that unreasonably burden or restrict this movement(42).
   
        And the constitutional right to travel between the states implies a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state(46).
        Ibid. p. 538

§239.   Property Rights

        This constitutional provision refers to the right to acquire and possess the absolute and unqualified title to every species of property recognized by law, with all rights incidental thereto(55).
        Ibid. p. 540
   
        The right of protecting property is not the simple right to protection by individual physical force, but is the right to protect property by the law of the land and the force of the body politic(57).
   
        Both state(58) and federal(59) constitutions prohibit the state from depriving a person of property without due process of law(60).
   
        Thus, before a person may be deprived of any significant interest, he or she must be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing(62).
        Ibid. pgs. 541 - 542

B. LIBERTY [§§243 - 245]

Summary

        The right to liberty consists of the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint as well as the right to do such acts as a person may judge best for his interests, and the right of a person to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties (§243).
Ibid. p. 552

§243.  In general

        Personal liberty is a fundamental interest, second only to life itself, protected under both the California and the United States Constitutions(17).  The term “liberty” as used in the state and federal constitutions(18) consists partially of the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint(19).  For example, the right of a citizen to drive on a public street with freedom from police interference, unless he or she is engaged in suspicious conduct associate in some manner with criminality, is a fundamental constitutional right(20).

[2] The people of the State of California are supreme and have the undoubted right to protect themselves and to preserve the form of government...
Steiner v. Darby (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 481

Persons dealing with a public agency are presumed to know the law and are bound at their peril to ascertain and follow those procedures necessary to enter into a binding contract. (See Miller v. McKinnon, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 89; Bear River etc. Corp. v. County of Placer (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 684 , 690 [258 P.2d 543].)
SEYMOUR v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 156 Cal.App.3d 200
[Civ. No. 22606. Court of Appeals of California, Third Appellate District. March 9, 1984.]

"Everyone is presumed to know the law.   And all applicable laws in existence when an agreement is made necessarily enter into it and form a part of it as fully as if they were expressly referred to and incorporated in its terms." (6 Cal.Jur. 310, § 186; Brown v. Ferdon, 5 Cal.2d 226  [54 P.2d 712]; Chapman v. Jocelyn, 182 Cal. 294 [187 P. 962]; Long v. Newman, 10 Cal.App. 430 [102 P. 534].)

The contracting parties were, therefore, presumed to know all existing laws...
Robertson v. Dodson, 54 Cal.App.2d 661
[Civ. No. 12069. First Dist., Div. One. Oct. 2, 1942.]

We thus require citizens to apprise themselves not only of statutory language but also of legislative history, subsequent judicial construction, and underlying legislative purposes (People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614, 620 [47 Cal.Rptr. 772, 408 P.2d 100]). (See generally Amsterdam, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court (1960) 109 U. Pa. L.Rev. 67.)
Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112

CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE
   
        1708.  Every person is bound, without contract, to abstain from injuring the person or property of another, or infringing upon any of his or her rights.

As is the case of illegal arrests, the officer is bound to know these fundamental rights and  privileges, and must keep within the law at his peril.
Thiede v. Town Of Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218. 231 (1944)

“...one who interferes with another's liberty does so at his peril”.
Knight v. Baker, 117 Ore. 492, 244 Pac. 543, 544 (1926).
   
"One who interferes with another's  liberty does so at his peril."
University of  Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 75, p. 491,  April 1927.
   
One who interferes with another’s liberty does so at his peril.
McBeath v. Campbell, 12 S.W.2d 118, 122 (1929)

When the  plaintiff has shown that he was arrested, imprisoned or restrained of his liberty  by the defendant,  "the law presumes it to be unlawful."
People v. McGrew (1888) 77 Cal. 570

 

Summary of California Law, vol 7, Constitutional Law, p. 9

B.  Constitution of California

    2.  ['51]  Restrictive and Enabling Provisions

        (a) Restrictions on State Powers.  The California Constitution, like other state constitutions, is generally a restriction upon the powers of the state.

...the state Constitution, as distinguished from the federal Constitution, does not constitute a grant of power, or an enabling act, to the legislature, but rather constitutes a limitation upon the powers of that body....we do not look to the Constitution to determine whether the legislature is authorized to do an act, but only to see if it is prohibited.  In other words, unless restrained by constitutional provision, the legislature is vested with the whole of the legislative power of the state. (Macmillan Co. v. Clarke, 184 Cal. 491 [194 P. 1030, 17 A.L.R. 288]; Mitchell v. Winnek, 117 Cal. 520, 525 [49 P. 579]; Jensen v. McCullough, 94 Cal.App. 382, 394 [271 P. 568]; People v. Rinner, 52 Cal.App. 747, 749 [199 P. 1066].)
Fitts v. Superior Court, 6 Cal.2d 230
[L. A. No. 15256. In Bank. April 30, 1936.]

...the fact that our Constitution is not a grant of power but rather a limitation or restriction upon the powers of the Legislature (In re Madera Irr. Dist., 92 Cal. 296 [28 P. 272, 675, 29 Am.St.Rep. 106, 14 L.R.A. 755]; Macmillan Co. v. Clarke, 184 Cal. 491 [194 P. 1030, 17 A.L.R. 288]; People ex rel. Smith v. Judge of the Twelfth District, 17 Cal. 547; Sheehan v. Scott, 145 Cal. 684 [79 P. 350]; Fitts v. Superior Court, 6 Cal.2d 230 [57 P.2d 510]; Mitchell v. Winnek, 117 Cal. 520 [49 P. 579]) and "that we do not look to the Constitution to determine whether the Legislature is authorized to do an act, but only to see if it is prohibited." (Fitts v. Superior Court, supra.)
Collins v. Riley, 24 Cal.2d 912
[S. F. No. 17019. In Bank. Oct. 2, 1944.]
       
CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE
   

4.  No action or proceeding commenced before this code takes effect, and no right accrued, is affected by this code,...

   
VEHICLE CODE

    Pending Proceeding and Accrued Rights
   

4.    No action or proceeding commenced before this code takes effect, and no right accrued, is affected by the provisions of this code,...   

       
CIVIL CODE
       

6.  No action or proceeding commenced before this Code takes effect, and no right accrued, is affected by its provisions.

GOVERNMENT CODE

100.      (a) The sovereignty of the state resides in the people thereof, and all writs and processes shall issue in their name.
              (b) The style of all process shall be "The People of the State of California," and all prosecutions shall be conducted in their name and by their authority.

6250.  In enacting this chapter, the Legislature, mindful of the right of individuals to privacy, finds and declares that access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state.

11120.   It is the public policy of this state that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business and the proceedings of public agencies be conducted openly so that the public may remain informed.

In enacting this article the Legislature finds and declares that it is the intent of the law that actions of state agencies be taken openly and that their deliberation be conducted openly.

The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created.

This article shall be known and may be cited as the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act.

54950 DECLARATION OF LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE.   "In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and declares that the public commissions, boards and councils and the other public agencies in this State exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business.  It is the intent of the law that their actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.
                                       
The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know.  The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created".